No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter
Triumph of Naked Divorce

J. HERBIE DiFONZO*

In recent years, widespread disillusionment over no-fault divorce has focused debate on the equity of conflicting distributive
schemes. The divorce revolution of the 1960's has generally been
condemned as a failed liberal reform. In this article, Professor
DiFonzo re-examines the origins of the no-fault movement, concluding that the abandonment offault grounds was conceived as a
conservative measure intended to facilitate the reversal of the escalating divorce rate and to replace traditionalmarital dissolution
with therapeutic divorce. Compulsory conciliationwas the key tool
in the anticipated era of modern divorce, in which newly-empowered family courts merged with the social-science and psychiatric
establishment to dramatically expand the state's role in supervising family life.
The reform collapsed at mid-point, achieving only the jettisoning of divorce grounds. Professor DiFonzo argues that while the
envisioned super-courts were never funded, an unintended consequence of the reform battle has survived to haunt divorce law for
the next generation. The elimination of grounds transformed mutual consent divorce, the operating milieu for most of the twentieth century, into divorce on demand. The transition in divorce law
from a mild reinforcement of mutuality to an enshrinement of the
right of unilateral marriage demolition has resulted in a significant loss for women.
"Love, the quest; marriage, the conquest; divorce, the inquest."1
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.S. 1974,
St. Joseph's College; J.D., M.A. 1977, Ph.D. 1993, University of Virginia. This article is
adapted from my forthcoming book,

BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE LEGAL CULTURE

OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (forthcoming 1995).

1. Helen Rowland, Reflections of a Bachelor Girl (1903), in PETER'S QUOTATIONS:
OUR TIME 324 (Laurence J. Peter ed., 1977).
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INTRODUCTION: THERAPEUTIC DIVORCE AFTER
WORLD WAR II

A.

"Directive Therapy" in Divorce

As the shift intensified in the structure of American family life
from the "institutional" to the "companionship" mode in the years
after World War II, divorce reformers focused on efforts to recast
the divorce court as a psychoanalytic institution, modelled after the
juvenile court. In an effort to win acceptance for their radical move
to stem the rising divorce rate, these reformers, led by Ohio Judge
Paul W. Alexander, proposed substituting therapeutic for fault divorce. But the true agenda of social control revealed itself in its coercive conciliation procedures. Therapeutic divorce represented
compelled nondivorce, holding families together through "directive"
psychiatry.
The last hurrah of therapeutic divorce came in the 1960s in England and California. Realizing that fault was no longer a barrier to
divorce by mutual consent, conservative reformers in both jurisdictions staged a dramatic gambit. In this last and sometimes comic
scenario, reformers gambled that eliminating all fault grounds would
be a sufficient enticement for divorce-minded couples to submit to a
reconciliation-minded social welfare establishment. This clash of
minds was supposed to yield a lower divorce rate. The reformers
nearly succeeded.
But the resulting fiasco not only facilitated a divorce boom, it enshrined in divorce law a predilection for absolute gender egalitarianism. Given the continuing extent of discrimination against women, as
manifested primarily in the labor force and in the cultural assumptions about the primacy of women's maternal and custodial role, a
divorce law mandating strict equality as to support and property distribution serves to perpetuate the disadvantaged field in which
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women find themselves after divorce. The reification of no-fault ideology has yielded divorce on demand, with little heed to the inequities of property division and child and spousal support. The rival law
systems have been made one, but order has not brought sanity.
B. Californiaand England
In codifying its laws in 1872, California provided for six divorce
grounds: adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful desertion, habitual intemperance, wilful neglect, and conviction of a felony.' The only statutory deviation from fault came in 1941, when the legislature
authorized divorces in cases of incurable insanity. In the 1960s, on
the eve of the most dramatic reform in American divorce law, the
Golden State calmly reflected the major trends in national divorce
patterns. Its divorce rate, though higher than the national average,
was on a par with its western neighbors. California had not experimented with incompatibility or living apart statutes, but its supreme
court had practically gutted recriminatory defenses.s In typical ten
minute court hearings, ninety-five percent of divorce complainants
blithely related prefabricated stories of their spouses' "extreme cruelty" destroying their marriage.
According to Herma Hill Kay, a leading figure in the 1960s nofault movement, "[I]t was impossible to make divorce easier in California than it already was." 4 Indeed, when Governor Edmund G.
Brown appointed a commission in 1966 to begin a "concerted assault
on the high incidence of divorce in our society and its often tragic
consequences, ' 5 some worried Californians rushed to the courts to
get divorced before the anticipated legal tightening took effect.6
In England, the official Church wielded its declining moral authority as best it could in favor of one last push against divorce. Under
the auspices of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Church's plan
called for a full-service family court, with a coterie of social science
2. CAL. CIv. CODE § 92 (West 1954).
3. See DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
4. HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 46-47 (1988) (footnote omitted).
5. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 1 (1966) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION] (quoting Governor Edmund G. Brown, Charge to the
Commission, May 11, 1966).
6. MICHAEL WHEELER, NO-FAULT DIVORCE 27-28 (1974).

experts ready to conduct a comprehensive "inquest" on every allegedly-deceased marriage.7 Heavily influenced by the report of the
Archbishop's group, the California reformers proposed a similar mix
of coercive therapy and legal obstacles to divorce.
Those petitioners who anticipated that the reformers would try to
raise the legal threshold correctly read the tea leaves of therapeutic
divorce. But those litigative sooners lacked confidence in their cohorts. Throughout the century, informal divorcing under cover of the
fault system had outflanked the conservative reforms in both England and the United States. In this final sally, the contradictions inherent in compulsory conciliation combined with a rejection of the
hefty price tag for family courts to yield a familiar divorce paradigm
in new clothes. The Anglo-American no-fault revolution was dressed
in the raiment of the therapeutic salvation of marriage. But the result was naked divorce.
II.

OBJECTIONS TO UTOPIA

In 1953, at a symposium on the interprofessional approach to family problems, maverick law professor Quintin Johnstone warned the
participants that, despite the popular appeal of family courts, their
spread faced strong opposition. Johnstone outlined the objections: the
high cost of the super-staffed tribunals, lawyers' distrust of social
workers and resentment of the potential loss of fees in a nonadversary procedure, the moral and ethical opposition of some members of
the bar and some religious groups to compulsory counseling, and the
sense that courthouse reconciliations attempted after the parties had
decided to divorce came too late.8 Johnstone turned out to be
prescient.
The opposition to compulsory conciliation first came from psychiatrists who objected to directed counseling. Believing the norms of
their profession were compromised in the quest for preserving marriages, some psychiatrists protested. As Dr. Thomas French explained, it was not a psychiatrist's business "either to try to save a
marriage or to try to destroy it."" Far from dovetailing with the reformers' premise that divorce-seekers were impulsive and childish,
the canon of individual empowerment began with the opposite presumption - that psychotherapy assisted adults to walk their own
7. REPORT OF THE MORTIMER COMMISSION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. PUTTING ASUNDER: A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 70 (1966) [hereinafter
PUTTING ASUNDER].
8. Quintin Johnstone, Family Courts, 22 U. KAN. CITY L. REV: 18 (1953).

9.

Thomas M. French, M.D., Contributions to a Therapeutic Solution to the Di-

vorce Problem: Psychiatry, in CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE 62, 62 (The University of Chicago Law School, Conference Series No. 9, Feb. 29, 1952) [hereinafter CONFERENCE ON
DIVORCE].
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road to personal independence.
Over and again, the advocates of reform acknowledged the tension
between therapeutic divorce and other therapeutic norms, only to fall
back on a melange of ideological hope and anecdotal experience,
clumsily cobbled together with reference to the effectiveness of the
juvenile court in dealing with recalcitrant children. Emily Mudd, the
director of the Marriage Council of Philadelphia, responded to Dr.
French's concerns by arguing that a skilled psychiatrist could assist
couples in generating the motivation to reconcile.' 0
Insisting that treatment could begin with reluctant patients, Mudd
noted that because "the most prevalent reason for divorce is the lack
of maturity of one or both partners

. . .

how can we expect the most

childish and immature voluntarily to seek help?""' Sarah Schaar,
the head of the legal department of Chicago's Jewish Family and
Community Center, stressed her "very definite feeling" that compulsory counseling worked. 12 Paul Alexander asserted that just as police
herded juveniles into court, so courts should steer couples into counseling. 3 He expected "respectable case work" to emerge from this
procedure.'4 New York City Judge Anna M. Kross responded to Dr.
French's remarks by stating that she had "yet to find the person
who, in the final analysis, is not willing to accept help."'"
Dr. French was outgunned in this exchange, and his views remained in the minority for years. In 1961, the A.B.A.'s Family Law
Section Subcommittee on the Conciliation Court reported the continuing controversy about the propriety of strong-armed conciliation.
While noting that many social workers find the tactics repugnant or
ineffective, the committee insisted that "all are convinced that what
we term 'gentle judicial coercion' plays an important role in effecting
reconciliations."' 6
Ultimately, the contrary views prevailed, resulting in a sharper
10. Emily H. Mudd, Contributionsto a TherapeuticSolution to the Divorce Problem: Social Work and MarriageCounseling, in CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE, supra note 9,
at 65, 67.
11. Id. at 68. Mudd compared couples seeking divorce to ten-year-olds biting,
scratching, and beating each other. Id. at 69.
12. Francis J. Nosek & Sarah Scharr, Discussion, in CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE,
supra note 9, at 69, 72.
13. Id. at 73.
14. Id.
15. Anna M. Kross, TherapeuticSolution of Family Conflicts, in CONFERENCE ON
DIVORCE, supra note 9, at 78, 80.
16. Roger A. Pfaff, The Conciliation Court of Los Angeles County, 1961 SEC.
FAM. L. 35, 37.

distinction between the role of judges and that of behavioral scientists. While perhaps not entirely sharing Thomas Szasz' view of compulsory counseling as "moral Fascism," 17 the mental health and
legal professions began to demarcate their boundaries more clearly.
Counseling took place away from the courthouse. Judges did not pretend to practice social work. This cleavage reflected a return to the
recognition of the antipodal natures of judging and counseling, and it
sounded the death knell for family courts.

III.

"BOB-HAIRED, FLAT-HEELED SOCIAL WORKERS"

Judge Paul W. Alexander, the leading proponent of family courts,
enjoyed telling the story of the older judge who thoroughly disliked
the notion of merging social science and law: "[He] told me that I
was wasting the taxpayers' money in hiring those bob-haired, flatheeled social workers; that their reports were illegal and that I would
get myself in trouble if I used them.""' That older judge was not the
only member of the legal profession who feared that family problems
would become the "domain of impractical, theoretical and inexperienced social workers."' 19
Lawyers' attacks on the family court ranged from petty dislike of
social workers and peevishness over the loss of fees should divorce
clients reconcile, to serious concerns that compulsory counseling unconstitutionally burdened an individual's right to privacy. 0 Juvenile
courts had already become "social workers' courts,"' z and some lawyers worried about the shift to "social information with its seemingly
alarming potentialities for destruction of traditional concepts of ad'22
versary litigation.
The divorce bar frequently complained about loss of legal fees
should family court judges and their social work contingents successfully reconcile otherwise divorce-bound clients. Paul Alexander
weighed in on the side of the social scientists, mockingly suggesting
that attorneys' reluctance to support conciliation was attributable to
17. THOMAS SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES 248 (1963).

18. Paul W. Alexander, What is a Family Court, Anyway?, 26 CONN. B. J. 243,
254-55 (1952).

19.

J. E. Bindeman, Comment on the Family Court Bill, 21 J.B. ASS'N D.C. 121,

122 (1954).

20. The latter argument was made by David E. Seidelson, Systematic Marriage
Investigation and Counseling in Divorce Cases: Some Reflections on its Constitutional
Propriety and General Desirability, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 60, 79-89 (1967). See the
discussion in ROBERT J. LEVY. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRE-

LIMINARY ANALYSIS 118-30 (monograph prepared for the Special Committee on Divorce
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1968).
21. Johnstone, supra note 8, at 21.
22. Allan Fisher, A Family Court for the District of Columbia, 20 J. B. ASS'N
D.C. 577 (1953). "
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venality: "For [matrimonial lawyers] divorce is their rent, their stenographer's salary, their baby's shoes, sometimes their solid gold
Cadillac. 2 a

Professional rivalry surely fueled the bar's antipathy to the amalgamation of law and social work. 24 But distrust of any system of
organizing knowledge and action which sought to displace the traditional role of client advocacy provided a strong motivation for many
barristers. Although their recalcitrance was sometimes phrased as an
insistence "that the law remain pure," 25 often a clannish repugnance
emerged, as in the churlish opinion of many judges and lawyers that
psychiatrists, social workers, and marriage counselors were a "dubious or even evil influence on our society."2 6
"Social workers' courts" were also expensive, although no consensus was reached on the affordability of family courts until the late
1960s.27 One side of the argument pointed to the enormous costs of

supporting a professional staff.28 The other acknowledged those expenses, but asserted that great savings to the court system and society would flow from decreased rates of divorce and juvenile

delinquency.

9

On balance, however, the most telling criticisms addressed the
23. See WHEELER, supra note 6, at 115. Both Judge Thomas J. Cunningham and
reporter John Bartlow Martin observed that some divorce attorneys disliked the Los Angeles Conciliation Court because it dampened their fee-generating ability. Thomas J.
Cunningham, Education, Conciliationas Solutions to Divorce, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY
RELATIONS:

A

COMPILATION OF THE ORIGINAL

DICTA

PUBLISHED BY THE VIRGINIA

LAW WEEKLY 1949-1950, at 46-49 (1950) [hereinafter DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS]; John B. Martin, Divorce: Effort to Save a Troubled Marriage,SATURDAY EVENING POST, Nov. 8, 1958, at 36, 139-42 (Nov. 8, 1958).

24. See, e.g., Gertrude Samuels, The Family Court - How It Could Work, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1956 (Magazine), at 17, 56-60; Sol M. Isaac, The Status of LawyerSocial Worker Cooperation,3 J. FAM. L. 53-62 (1963); Roger A. Pfaff, The Role of the
Social Worker in the Judicial Process, 50 A.B.A. J. 565-68 (1964).
25. John B. Martin, Divorce: A Little Nest of Hate, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
Nov. 22, 1958, at 36, 121-26; see also JOHN H. MARIANO, A PSYCHOANALYTIC LAWYER
LOOKS AT MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 254-56 (1952) (expressing concern that social workers had been trained to view clients in general categories, while lawyers focused on the
individual).
26. THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 159, 160 (Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz eds.,
1965) (quoting treatise by Quintin Johnstone).
27. Howard A. Krom, California'sDivorce Law Reform: An HistoricalAnalysis,
1 PAC. L.J. 156, 171 (1970).
28. See, e.g., William M. Kephart, The Family Court: Some Socio-Legal Implications, 1955 WASH. U. L.Q. 61, 71; Quintin Johnstone, Divorce: The Place of the Legal
System in Dealing with Marital-DiscordCases, 31 OR. L. REV. 297, 322-23 (1952).
29. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 18, at 265-66; Max Rheinstein, The Law of
Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 VAND. L. REV. 633, 637 (1956);
Henry H. Foster, Jr., Procrustes and the Couch, 2 J. FAM. L. 85, 93 (1962).

central concerns of power in society and the different approaches of
law and social science to the resolution of issues of authority. In an
oft-cited 1956 article, Professor Max Rheinstein asked rhetorically if
American society was "ready to concede to the state that same grave
power [as in criminal law] of transforming the personality structure
of a citizen simply because he has failed to make a success out of a
marriage with some other individual? ' 30 The therapeutic divorce advocates were ready, but American society was beginning to retreat
from that perimeter.

IV.

THE "FAIRYLAND OF BENEVOLENCE"

The rejection of the family court ideal was of a piece with the
reconsideration of the juvenile courts in the 1960s. Following up on
the early criticism of Paul Tappan and others, Charles W. Tenney,
Jr. described the yawning gap between the magnanimous ideals of
the juvenile court and its shoddy performance to date. Writing in the
1969 Annals of the American Academy of Politicaland Social Science, Tenney called the juvenile court myth a "fairyland of benevolence." 3' 1 The deprivation of a juvenile's rights proved to be the dark
side of ostensible compassion, as the United States Supreme Court
discovered in two 1960s cases, Kent v. United States32 and In re
33
Gault.
The problems with the juvenile court were legion, beginning with
deficient staffing and funding. 34 A 1963 survey found that 25% of
juvenile judges had no legal education; worse, 20% had no college
education. 35 One-third of the judges reported that they had no probation officers or social workers attached to their court.3 Appointment as a juvenile court judge, a shining honor at the outset, had
slid in prestige by mid-century to the embarrassment of serving on
what was nicknamed the "diaper squad. 37 The effort to banish lawyers from the court had largely succeeded; but the exclusion resulted
30. Rheinstein, supra note 29, at 639.
31. Charles W. Tenney, Jr., The Utopian World of Juvenile Courts, 383 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 104, 107 (May 1969); see also PAUL TAPPAN. JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY passim (1949).
32. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
33. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
34. On the "haphazard" arrangement of juvenile court resources, see ANDREW J.
POLSKY, THE RISE OF THE THERAPEUTIC STATE 94-97 (1991).

35.
36.

These findings were reported in Tenney, supra note 31, at 116.
Id.

37. Id. at 110. See also Will C. Turnbladh, Midcentury White House Conference
of Children and Youth, 2 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 11, 11-12, 26 (1951) (juvenile courts lack
the status of other courts and consequently have difficulty attracting high-caliber judges).
In 1967, the President's Commission of Law Enforcement bemoaned the disappearance
from juvenile courts of the "mature and sophisticated judge, wise and well-versed in law
and the science of human behavior." TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
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in the invisibility of juvenile issues in legal academia. Not until 1967
was the first case book published on the subject of juvenile courts.38
The confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings exacerbated the
lack of public and professional attention devoted to these issues. In
many ways, these once-revolutionary courts had become the backwater of the law.
But the deeper dilemma was structural: combining the powers of a
criminal court with the resources of a social agency resulted in an
undigestible stew. Judge Alexander insisted that the Bill of Rights
did "not readily fit into the picture of the juvenile courts," and complained that the court itself was not receiving a "fair trial."3 9 But in
the words of contemporary critic David Matza, the juvenile court
"masquerade[d] as a civil court despite its tell-tale dealings in penal
sanction. 40 In the 1960s, the mask was lifted.
The renewed emphasis on "rights" found in the Kent and Gault
cases reflected a sense that the project of socialized justice had been
tried and found wanting. The Supreme Court attributed the "highest
motives and most enlightened impulses" to the originators of the juvenile court. 41 But it remarked that the "constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is - to say the least debatable."4 2 And in practice, the Justices mildly concluded, "the
results have not been entirely satisfactory." 43 Law Professor Henry
H. Foster, Jr. crisply summed up the import of Gault's insistence on
procedural due process for juveniles in remarking that the Supreme
to believe that kangaroo-court procedures are
Court "refuses
44
therapeutic.
AND YOUTH CRIME 7 (1967). Herma Hill Kay noted that juvenile and domestic relations

assignments went to junior judges in many urban jurisdictions, and even a six-month
rotation was more than many judges desired. Herma H. Kay, A Family Court: The
California Proposal, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1205, 1208-09 (1968). One family court judge
wittily pointed out why most divorce judges dislike their work: "There isn't much satisfaction in being the referee in a series of fixed fights where a one round knockout has

been arranged for in advance. Robert W. Hansen, Three Dimensions of Divorce, 50
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3 (1966).
38.

See

ORMAN

W.

KETCHAM &

RELATING TO JUVENILE COURTS

39.

MONRAD

G.

PAULSEN,

CASES AND MATERIALS

(1967).

Paul W. Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 A.B.A. J.

1206, 1207 (1960).
40. Alexander, supra note 39, at 1207; DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr
71 (1964).
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; Henry H. Foster, Jr., The Future of Family Law, 383 ANNALS AM. ACA.
POL. & SOC. SC. 129, 143 (May 1969).

The founders' substitution of a social evaluation of the child for a
legal trial of the offense resulted in a functional presumption of guilt
and the application of punitive sanctions under the guise of treatment.4 5 Judge Alexander blasted the adversarially-oriented juvenile

court lawyer who "possesses no social conscience or is constitutionally contentious or vainly legalistic or mentally myopic, [and who]
seems impelled to earn his fee by putting on a show for his client."46
But Law Professor Thomas A. Coyne called for the return of adversarial lawyers to the juvenile court to reestablish the balance between the court and the juvenile. 47 Finally, in 1970, the Supreme
Court insisted that the adult criminal law standard requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt applied during the adjudicatory stage of
juvenile proceedings. The juvenile court was, in short, ordered to act
more like a court and less like an omnipotent and irresponsible social
agency.48

Contempt for juvenile court processes was not limited to the bench
and bar. Social personnel dealing with juvenile delinquency were

also critical of the unproductive yoking of therapeutic discourse and
a legal setting. Andrew Polsky aptly summarized their perspective:
A legalistic outlook warped the court's understanding of its clients: while
science might disdain rigid categories and simple labels, a judicial institution found them indispensable. Further, given that according to the therapeutic ideal a client had to participate voluntarily in the treatment
relationship, it did not seem possible to treat youngsters under the court's
direction. Juvenile offenders certainly grasped the cold fact that they were
subject to legal discipline. And this led them to dismiss clinicians associated
with the court
as an annoyance or to manipulate them to secure lenient
49
treatment.

The reconstitution of juvenile justice paralleled the disintegration
45.
46.

Foster, Jr., supra note 44, at 143.
Alexander, supra note 39, at 1209. Social Work Professor Tom A. Croxton

also called for the juvenile court bar to trade its adversariness for a role as a "participant
decision maker," part of the "dispositional team," including behavioral scientists and the
court, all sharing the aim of rehabilitating the child. Tom A. Croxton, The Kent Case
and Its Consequence, 7 J. FAM. L. 1 (1967).
47. Thomas A. Coyne, Who Will Speak for the Child?, 383 ANNALS AM. ACA.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 34, 34-47 (May 1969).
48. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The following year, the Court drew the
line in the recriminalization of the juvenile court at the imposition of a jury trial requirement. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court declined to extend
to juveniles the constitutional right to a trial by jury, thus preserving for the juvenile
court at least one of the attributes of its independent procedure.
49. POLSKY, supra note 34, at 191 (citations omitted). For a contemporary perspective, see Karl Birnbaum, A Court Psychiatrist's View of Juvenile Delinquents, 261
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 57, 57-58 (Jan. 1949). Robert Kramer observed in

1959 that, in their preoccupation with rehabilitation, some juvenile courts "overlook the
fact that sometimes people don't want to be reformed, and that sometimes people don't
want to be told what to do, even if the advice is wise." DUKE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF
FAMILY LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF FAMILY LAW 9-10 (John S. Bradway
ed., 1959) (quoting Robert Kramer) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
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of support for the family court idea. Even though William M.
Kephart asserted in 1955 that he could not recall a single article
attacking the family court in law journals, social science publications, or daily newspapers, the plethora of kudos had not produced
comprehension. 50 At the end of the decade, Judge Alexander was
still heard protesting that "very few people understand what a family court is or how it operates." 51
But perhaps most people understood too well. As the failure of the
court-supervised Utah marriage counseling experiment illustrated,
the blend of judicial compulsion and therapeutic independence satisfied no one, least of all the baffled and frustrated clients. 52 Not only
had family courts been invented to "solve" the predicament of troubled families, but the "solution" was preordained to be enforced reconciliation in the majority of cases. 53
That American divorce practices remained unyielding in the face
of this double bind should, in retrospect, have come as no surprise.
Courts, as Charles Tenney reminded his readers, "do not solve
The peremptory tools of a court's
problems; they resolve issues.
legal equipment render it ill-suited to broad social or psychological
questions.
Recognition of this limitation was, of course, at the heart of the
therapeutic divorce advocates' call for an infusion of social science
experts into the heart of the court's decision-making. But the expectation that social casework would catalyze judicial operation did not
count on the converse impact. As courts became socialized, counseling assumed a judicial demeanor. When criticized, the system pulled
apart again. These contradictions might be termed a socio-legal
Heisenberg comedy: even when the position of a family court could
be identified, its momentum carried it elsewhere.
Moreover, many family courts were socialized in name only; understaffed, underfunded, and overwhelmed, they processed domestic
cases on an assembly line indistinguishable from the procedure in
standard-issue civil courts with divorce jurisdiction. Sociologist Ray
50. Kephart, supra note 28, at 61.
51. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 49, at 174. Indeed, one hint that the family court
idea had not been fully digested by American professionals was the glib nature of its
universal acceptance. Quintin Johnstone reported that family courts were acceptable to
both divorce liberals and conservatives, even those opposed to divorce on religious
grounds. Johnstone, supra note 28, at 317.
52. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Utah MarriageCounseling Experiment: An Account of Changes in Divorce Law and Procedure, 7 UTAH. L. REV. 443 (1961).
53. Id.
54. Tenney, supra note 31, at 117 (emphasis omitted).

Baber described the weary scene at such courts in the 1950s:
Judges without special training, too few probation officers or officers with
little or no qualification for their work, and a lack of technically trained
specialists such as psychiatrists frequently make of the court a poor imitation of what it could be. It is depressing to sit and watch cases pass in array
before the judge - cases in which the trouble has been developing for ten
years, yet which are disposed of in ten minutes by a judge whose remarks to
the persons before him show no understanding of their problems. A tired
officer will lay a few record sheets before the judge before he hears the
principals and whisper a few words to him in recommendation. Often these
are based upon an extremely brief contact with the principals . . .

Baber's observations seem almost impossible to reconcile with Alexander's rhetoric and practice. But perhaps that was the problem.
Max Rheinstein opined that he would willingly support an open-ended family court regime if "all the courts

. . .

would be staffed with

Paul Alexanders. '' 56 Alexander himself may have appeared everywhere, but he only sat in Toledo.
From the outset, the therapeutic divorce venture had also been
plagued by underfunding.5 7 The 1948 White House Conference had
focused national attention on the report of Alexander and Reginald
Heber Smith, calling for their new approach to divorce reform. The
report was adopted by the 1948 and 1949 Conventions of the American Bar Association, both of which expressed the desire that President Truman appoint a National Commission."8
But despite his "wholehearted concurrence in the objectives of the
Conference, ' 59 Truman did not act, and the A.B.A. was forced to
establish its own commission in 1950.0 Hopes that government or
private foundations would fund research were dashed, with the single
exception of Maxine Virtue's 1956 field study of metropolitan divorce courts. 1
Max Rheinstein, as a member of the A.B.A.'s Interprofessional
Commission, succeeded in persuading the University of Chicago's
Comparative Law Research Center to conduct several seminars,
which resulted in the publication of some essays on the subject. All
55. RAY E. BABER, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 668 (2d ed. 1953).
56. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 49, at 199. For nearly three decades, Paul Alexander served as Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Toledo, Ohio.
57. MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW viii-ix
(1972).

58. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 57; see also Charlton Ogburn, The Role of Legal Services in Family Stability, 272 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 127 (1950); Mabel
A. Elliott, Divorce Legislation and Family Instability, 272 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. ScI. 134 (1950).
59.

UNITED STATES INTER-AGENCY

COMMITTEE

ON BACKGROUND

NAT'L CONFERENCE ON FAMILY LIFE, THE AMERICAN FAMILY:

A

MATERIALS,

FACTUAL BACK-

GROUND at ii (1949).
60. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 57; Ogburn, supra note 58; Elliott, supra note 58.
61. MAXINE B. VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN COURT (1956).
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in all, it was an anticlimactic yield from such a melodramatic beginning. 62 But even greater anticlimax lay ahead.
The proponents of therapeutic divorce had always championed integrated family courts to deal with all domestic issues, from delinquency to divorce. But the constitutionalization of juvenile court
procedure effected by the Supreme Court in the 1960s highlighted
the fact that the adjudication of juvenile delinquency - even by a
'socialized' court - was a function of criminal law. 63
The more that therapeutic divorce proponents coupled the essence
of the family court to the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile
court, the more that divorce-minded couples were reminded of the
obloquy expressed by the reformers' rhetoric that divorce was largely
impulsive and that irresponsible divorce was a crime against society.
Divorce and crime proved to be oil and water. Alexander's view that
the family court "should have in reserve ample authority for dealing
with people who seem to understand only the language of authority," 64 certainly appeared to paint divorce with the same brush used
for criminal cases.
The steeply rising divorce rate among the middle-class in the
1960s swept into the issue millions who believed that the criminal
law and the juvenile court were largely state measures for the control of the lower class.6 5 While one family court judge wondered if
"placing juvenile matters in the same court with husband-and-wife
cases will have a debilitating effect upon the long-developed specialized approaches of the juvenile court," many couples considering divorce worried about the spillover in the other direction. 6
The linkage of divorce and crime was also a product of institutional cross-fertilization. In 1959, the National Probation and Parole
Association proposed a model family tribunal in its Standard Family
Court Act.67 The plan was developed in cooperation with the United
62.

RHEINSTEIN,

63.

See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1

supra note 57.

(1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
64. Paul W. Alexander, Family Life Conference Suggests New Judicial Procedures and Attitudes Toward Marriage and Divorce, 32 J. AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y 43

(1948).
65.

LYNNE C. HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES, 285-86 (1980).
66. Jacob T. Zukerman, The Family Court - Evolving Concepts, 383 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 127 (May 1969). See also the discussion of this phenome-

non by Halem, supra note 65, at 285-86.
67. 5 NAT'L PROBATION AND PAROLE
man, supra note 66, at 126.

ASS'N J. 97,

99-160 (1959). See also Zuker-

States Children's Bureau and the National Council of Juvenile
Court Judges. 8 Court services available under the model included
both probation officers and marriage counselors.69 The frequent cry
of therapeutic reformers that divorce breeded juvenile delinquency
was answered by the development of comprehensive family courts,
equipped with an equal measure of arrows and olive branches. The
message could hardly have been clearer: if you fail to heed the marriage counselor, you will have to deal with the probation officer. As
Paul Alexander's axiom expressed7 0it, "[W]ho doth not answer to the
rudder shall answer to the rock."
V.

DIVORCE IN THE ENGLISH STYLE

In 1963, on the introduction in Parliament of a bill permitting divorce upon seven years' marital separation, the Archbishop of Canterbury protested so stridently that the effort to introduce no-fault
divorce was withdrawn.71 Yet before the end of the decade, Great
Britain, led by its Church, had revolutionized divorce law and substantially influenced the course of reform in the United States.72
The English Divorce Reform Act of 1969 was intended to eliminate the hypocrisy of the fault system, with its expansion of the cruelty ground beyond all reason, while more effectively preserving
marriages.73 It soon became clear, however, that Parliament had approved only a half-hearted therapeutic divorce measure which had
absolutely failed. The entropy of divorce-minded wives and husbands
could not be contained.
As recently as 1962, an important book on English divorce practice asserted that "the law of the Church is the rock on which much
of our modern law has been built. ' 74 The Church of England's legislative views were largely articulated by Parliament acting in full accord with Church principles. Legal regulation of marriage reflected
the strength of this unity of expression. Lord Penzance's judicial dictum that marriage "as understood in Christendom may

. . .

be de-

fined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to
the exclusion of all others" 75 encapsulated the position of both
Church and State toward the central institution of social life.
68. NAT'L PROBATION AND PAROLE ASS'N J., supra note 67, at 99-160.
69. Id.
70. VIRTUE, supra note 61, dedication (quoting the words mounted above a model
of a ship located in Judge Alexander's chambers at the Toledo Family Court).
71. See Olive M. Stone, The Matrimonial Causes and Reconciliation Bill 1963, 3
J. FAM. L. 87 (1963).
72. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW
IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1977).

73.
74.
75.

WILLIAM LATEY, THE TIDE OF DIVORCE 152-57 (1970).
JOHN M. BIGGS, THE CONCEPT OF MATRIMONIAL CRUELTY 2 (1962).
Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee I L.R. - P. & D. 130, 130 (1866).
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In the 1950s, the massive and unsuccessful effort by the Morton
Commission to examine and revise the entire structure of English
marriage and divorce law reflected deep social fissures. Robert S. W.
Pollard, Chair of the Marriage Law Reform Society, noted the common opinion among "responsible adults" in the 1950s that if a divorce is necessary, "it should be by agreement and without
rancour."76 Under the current state of the law, Pollard added, this
conviction led to the commission of collusion and perjury."
At the outset of the decade, Eirene White introduced a private
member bill in Parliament proposing a "marital breakdown" standard for divorce, one that could be met when the couple had been
separated for seven years.78 In view of the controversy raised by her
proposal, White withdrew the bill in exchange for the government's
agreement to establish a Royal Commission to study the issue.79
The Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, chaired by Lord
Morton of Henryton, considered a prodigious amount of evidence,
heard from 67 organizations and 48 individuals, conducted 102
meetings, labored for 4 years, and produced a report in 1956 containing more than 400 pages.80 In the end, deeply fractured, it settled nothing.
The Morton Commission stalemate revealed the Church of England's power as "the most influential opponent of change in the matrimonial law." 81 The Archbishop of Canterbury strongly argued
against any reform, and his views largely prevailed, as no legislative
change could be premised on such a divided Report."2 The Church's
memorandum submitted to the Commission insisted that only the
fault regime validated true moral principle. Awarding a divorce to a
guilty party would reek of injustice. The Church earnestly maintained that Eirene White's bill would supply the motivation for unscrupulous interlopers to form illicit liaisons with married persons,
incited by the knowledge that the faithless spouse would be free to

76.
REV. 39
77.
78.

Robert S. W. Pollard, The Need for an Inquiry into Divorce, 117 CONTEMP.
(1951).
Id.
PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 7, at 9-12; DOROTHY M. STETSON, A WOMAN'S
ISSUE: THE POLITICS OF FAMILY LAW REFORM IN ENGLAND 159-61 (1982).
79. Stone, supra note 71, at 93.
80. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1956,
CMD 9678.
8 1. Oliver B. McGregor, Equality, Sexual Values and Permissive Legislation, 1 J.
Soc. POL'Y 51 (1972).

82. See

RHEINSTEIN,

supra note 57, at 323.

marry the paramour in seven years. s3
VI. "DivORcE, THE INQUEST"
In 1963 Leo Abse attempted to revive in Parliament Eirene
White's 1951 proposal for divorce upon seven years of separation. In
the House of Lords, the Archbishop of Canterbury opposed a separation ground as a subterfuge for promoting divorce by consent.84
Abse's bill failed. However, in the course of debate, the Archbishop
also expressed his dissatisfaction with the existing law and the lax
procedures in divorce courts:
If it were possible to find a principle at law of breakdown of marriage
which was free from any trace of the idea of consent, which conserved the
point that offenses and not only wishes are the basis of the breakdown, and
which was protected by a far more thorough insistence on reconciliation
procedure first, then I would wish to consider it.85

In the spirit of therapeutic divorce, the Archbishop intended any
new marital breakdown standard as a tool for tightening, not liberalizing, divorce law and procedure.8 6 Conservatives had always maintained that a single act (or even repeated incidents) of adultery or
cruelty did not necessarily destroy the marriage.87 The marital fault
system granted divorces upon proof of transgression, even when
breakdown was not established. This regime had once been prized
not for its subjective virtue, but for its stark objectivity in staking
out some line of demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable
marriages.8 8 Now that line had crumbled.
The Archbishop was hinting in the House of Lords debate that the
law should go further: it should require that divorce-minded spouses
not only prove their partners' guilt, but further establish that the
marital relation had irrevocably terminated because of that culpable
83. The memorandum is detailed in PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 7, at 91-92.
84. The Archbishop was not alone among church leaders. On April 3, 1963, a joint
statement opposing the seven years' separation proposal was issued by the heads of the
Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of Wales, and the Free
Church Federal Council. Secular opposition to the proposal came three days later in a
speech attacking Abse's bill by Sir Jocelyn Simon, President of the Probate, Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court. See Stone, supra note 71, at 94 (1963).
85. 250 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1547 (1963).
86. Id.
87. As Reginald Haw, Vicar of Humberstone, put it in his matrimonial treatise,
"[I]t is nothing short of astounding that there was so little realization . . . that worse
things can happen to a marriage than adultery." REGINALD HAW, THE STATE OF MATRI-

MONY 105 (1952).
88. See PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 7, at 29-30; RHEINSTEIN, supra note 57, at
3; GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 14-15 (1991); RODERICK PHILLIPS. PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 566 (1988);

Timothy B. Walker, Disarming the Litigious Man: A Glance at Fault and California's
New Divorce Legislation, I PAC. L.J. 182-222 (1970).
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action. 9 The Church would put its moral weight behind a new form
of divorce, fault-plus.
In 1964, the Archbishop appointed a committee to explore the
Church's position on marriage breakdown as a divorce standard.9"
After two years of study, the group published Putting Asunder: A
Divorce Law for Contemporary Society. 91 Consistent with the Archbishop's earlier comments in the House of Lords, the group declared
that a breakdown standard was neither the equivalent of divorce by
consent, nor "incompatible with a covenant of lifelong intention." 92
Echoing the reproaches of Paul Alexander and the family court
movement, the Archbishop's group launched a devastating attack on
the hypocrisy and fraud of the marital fault system, scoring it "not
only on moral and legal grounds, but on social and psychological
[grounds] as well."9 3 It called for fault to be dethroned as the divorce criterion and replaced by marriage breakdown. 94 Rejecting a
menu approach to divorce legislation, the Church group emphasized
that fault and marriage breakdown were philosophically incompatible systems.95
But Putting Asunder went much further than previous approaches. It articulated a system of legal proof of breakdown by
analogy to a coroner's inquest. 96 As a coroner scrutinizes a corpse for
clues to its demise, so courts should conduct an inquest on each assertedly dead marriage to determine whether resuscitation - a task
normally beyond the capacity of a medical examiner - was
possible.97
The primary consequence of this bold critique of, and alternative
to, the present divorce system would be a startling increase in judicial intervention in daily life. The courts would conduct an inquest to

89.

250 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 1547 (1963).
supra note 7, at i.
91. PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 7.
92. Id. at 17-18.
93. Id. at 28.
94. Id. at 28-29. In its appendix on psychological considerations, for instance, the
Report noted:
[I]f we concentrate our attention wholly on the actions that are designated
"matrimonial offences," we inevitably fail to do justice to the complex of motives in the two interacting persons which finally drives the one to act and the
other to treat the action as ground for a divorce petition.
Id. at 144.
95. Id. at 31-32, 59.
96. Id. at 76-77.
97. Id.
90.

PUTTING ASUNDER,

evaluate the moribund status of every marriage submitted for divorce. Thus, the pro forma procedure adopted in undefended petitions would have to be scrapped. Because approximately ninety-three
percent of all divorce petitions were unopposed,"8 the escalating demands on the justice system would be astronomical. In fact, Putting
Asunder suggested that, given the requirements of an inquest, "an
uncontested case could on occasion call for greater care and judicial
skill than one that was contested." 99
The extent of official intrusion into private life was also reflected
in the drafters' call for "considerably expanded" pleadings in divorce
cases. 100 These would detail "the history of the marriage in question,
the reasons alleged for its failure, any attempts made to achieve reconciliation, and all arrangements proposed for the care of any children, for the disposal of property, and for maintenance in
general."' 01
Establishing "fault" under the existing divorce law would not
guarantee a decree, because a petitioner would still bear the burden
of showing marital breakdown.Y2 Nor would petitioners be assured
that theirs would be the only voice a judge heard.10 3 The Archbishop's group recommended that the divorce court have "discretionary power to require the attendance of both parties."104
The penalty for failing to satisfy the enhanced breakdown standard was denial of the divorce decree. The court should refuse the
decree where it felt the proposed maintenance was not adequate to
the dependent spouse or children, or "where the conduct of the petitioner in regard to the marriage was found to be such that in the
court's judgement making a decree would be against the public interest."'' 0 5 In addition to raising the ante by inventing this fault-plus
standard, Putting Asunder gave divorce judges carte blanche power
98. THE LAW COMMISSION, REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE: THE FIELD
OF CHOICE, 1966, CMND 3123, at 30 [hereinafter FIELD OF CHOICE].
99. PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 7, at 77. To prevent the "automatic" processing of uncontested divorces, the drafters opposed transferring jurisdiction of such cases to
county courts. Id.
100. Id. at 68.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 76-77.
103. Id. at 68, 70.
104. Id. at 68. Unafraid to prolong the inquest, the Church of England proposed
that a judge have the power "to adjourn the case in order to secure the attendance of a
party not present." Id. The drafters were far from sanguine that all relevant facts would
come to light if the fact-finding process were left to the parties and their counsel alone.
Indeed, they felt that the lax process of the courts yielded a street standard of divorce by
consent. Given the traditional reluctance of common law judges to engage in inquisitorial
procedure, they recommended that, especially in uncontested cases, "provision should be
made for the intervention, when needed, of counsel representing the public interest or the
interests of children of the family." Id. at 70.
105. Id. at 30, 75.
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to keep the yoke clamped in the "public interest."' 1 6
The comprehensive therapeutic nature of the Church's program
was evident in its call for a massive infusion of forensic social workers "as part of immediate procedural reform.' 0 7 These new court
officers would assist judges in verifying attempts at reconciliation,
testing the reliability of assertions made to the court, and providing
further investigative services as requested. 10 8 Putting Asunder
served, in short, as the Church of England's last clarion call for conservative reform and as a radical effort to reverse the flow of English
divorces.
VII. THE LEGISLATIVE FATE OF "PUTTING ASUNDER"

Despite the prominent reception of Putting Asunder, it soon became apparent that the Church could acquiesce in, but no longer
command or withstand, divorce reform. Within three months of the
publication of the report of the Archbishop's group, the Law Commission produced its own report, Reform of the Grounds of Divorce:
The Field of Choice.' 9

The Law Commission rejected the Church's blueprint for an intrusive family court on the grounds of cost and impracticality." 0
Moreover, a "detailed inquest into the whole married life would
prove more distasteful and embarrassing" than present fault-based
but cursory proceedings."' Nor was the Law Commission impressed
by compulsory conciliation. Reconciliation efforts made mandatory
would degenerate into wasting "[t]he time of marriage guidance
counsellors

. . .

on 'cock and bull' stories to the detriment of sincere

applicants.""' 2
In detailing its own breakdown scheme, however, the Law Commission chose to reconstitute the old grounds of fault, deeming them
alternate methods of showing marital breakdown." 3 Additionally,
106.

Id. at 70.

107. Id.
108. Id. The Archbishop's group made no reference to the significant shortage of
English social workers in the 1960s, nor any suggestion as to how this personnel deficiency would be remedied.

109.

FIELD OF CHOICE,

supra note 98. The Law Commission had been established

to review all English law "with a view towards its systematic development and reform,
including . . .the elimination of anomalies . . .and, generally, the simplification and
modernization of the law." Law Commissions Act 1965, § 3.
110. FIELD OF CHOICE, supra note 98, at 30-31.
111. Id. at 31.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 48-49.

the dissolution of the conjugal relationship could also be premised on
two new living apart provisions. Furthermore, divorce could be obtained upon irretrievable marital breakdown which could be proven
in one of five ways: adultery, cruelty, desertion for two years, separation for two years if the respondent did not object, or separation for
five years.114 With only minor changes, these proposals became law
in the Divorce Reform Act of 1969.115

The English reforms maintained the shell of therapeutic divorce,
and, as we will see, greatly influenced the California no-fault law. In
fact, had the Law Commission's proposals achieved their literal effect, the Divorce Reform Act would have truly achieved a radical
conservative revolution. But the Commissioners did away with fault
grounds only to revive them as "elements" of the new breakdown
standards."" Proof of a fault "element" would no longer guarantee a
successful divorce, for the court was specifically authorized to117make
an independent evaluation of the alleged marital breakdown.
Church and state each believed that the 1969 legislation had
ushered in a new era of honesty in domestic relations. A stabilization
of divorce rates was anticipated, and the bulk of the divorces that
did occur would fall into the two breakdown-separation categories. 18
Both these expectations were crushed. The Act was quickly judged a
failure."19 Most strikingly, divorce reform, a la marital breakdown,
resulted in an even more explosive burst of cruelty petitions, from
17.7% of all cases in 1971 to 41.4% in 1986.120 The continued

proliferation of behavior-based petitions represented a desire for
quick terminations that outweighed the negligible stigma attached to
fault divorces. Between 1971 and 1986, the percentage of fault-based
petitions ranged between 61.4% and 77.8 %, despite the existence of
two living apart alternatives.' 2 ' Establishing spousal cruelty had remained as easy as ever.
The 1988 Law Commission concluded that the Church of England
had been right two decades earlier in insisting on the incompatibility
114. Id. at 49. For the full text of the proposals and explanatory text, see The
Grounds of Divorce, 117 NEW L.J. 827-28 (1967).
115. Divorce Reform Act, 1969, ch. 55 (Eng.). The principal change effected by
Parliament was that a petitioner who desired to obtain a divorce on the two-year separation ground was required to obtain the consent of the respondent, not merely the absence
of objection. For further analysis of the legislation, see George G. Brown, Divorce Reform Act 1969, 120 NEW L.J. 74 (1970); GLENDON, supra note 72, at 194-96; LATEY,
supra note 73, at 152-60.
116. FIELD OF CHOICE, supra note 98, at 49.
117. Id.
118. GREAT BRITAIN LAW COMMISSION. FACING THE FUTURE: A DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE GROUND FOR DIVORCE 30 (1988) [hereinafter FACING THE FUTURE].
119. J.M. Eekelaar, The Place of Divorce in Family Law's New Role, 38 MOD. L.
REv. 241, 248-50 (1975).
120. FACING THE FUTURE, supra note 118, at Appendix B.
121. Id.
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of a blend of fault and non-fault grounds within a single divorce system.12 2 But the Law Commission that wrote Field of Choice, had
also been correct in believing that marital breakdown was not justiciable. Acknowledging that the 1969 compromise had been described
in professional journals as "uneasy" and even "bungling," the 1988
Law Commission pioposed, finally, to completely divorce fault from
matrimonial law.123
What happened to the Divorce Reform Act of 1969? As the Law
Commission belatedly acknowledged in 1988, the internal logic of a
matrimonial breakdown system leads ineluctably to divorce on demand. 24 This eventuality is precisely what the Archbishop's group
worked to avoid. But once the Church opened the door to divorce
reform, the liberalization movement, which had hitherto operated
within the courts' trivialization of the cruelty ground, emerged as the
dominant force in family law. 25
We next turn to the greatest American effort to install the philosophy and mechanism of therapeutic divorce. California closely followed the news from England, both in heartily proposing and in
ultimately rejecting a comprehensive family court.

VIII.

THE FINAL BOOMERANG OF CONSERVATIVE REFORM

In 1963, the same year in which Leo Abse's no-fault bill triggered
the divorce reform process in Parliament, California Assembly member Pearce Young initiated a study to identify issues and amass information "with a view towards developing a legislative program to
strengthen family relations.' 2 6 Young's initiative resulted in the establishment of legislative committees to consider measures dealing
with family life, including reform of the divorce laws. At three public hearings held in 1964, a variety of legal, scientific, theological,
and lay witnesses criticized California's divorce system, linking it to
122.
123.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 17 & n.80, 30. In its comprehensive report for the 1990s, FAMILY LAW:
THE GROUND FOR DIVORCE (1990), the Law Commission recommended that irretrievable breakdown remains the fulcrum of the divorce question. Breakdown should "be
proved by the passage of a twelve month period of time which would both provide solid

and objective evidence of the breakdown and enable the parties to resolve its practical
consequences before the divorce itself was granted." GREAT BRITAIN LAW CoMMISSION,
TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT: 1990, at 9.

124.
125.

FACING THE FUTURE, supra note 118, at 30.

126.

Krom, supra note 27, at 158 (quoting News Release from Office of Assembly

Id.

Member Pearce Young, 5th Assembly Distr., Mar. 15, 1963).

the increasing social and moral deterioration of society. 27
Judge Roger Pfaff, who presided over the Los Angeles Conciliation Court, vigorously argued at one of the hearings for an extension
of mandatory conciliation services throughout the state, claiming
that nearly ninety percent of California divorces are "neither necessary nor justified . . . provided these people could actually have
some counseling and were interested in saving their marriage. 1 28

The committee members were quite favorably impressed by Pfaff's
testimony. 129

In his message to the committee, Governor Edmund G. Brown
emphasized that divorce "erodes the very foundation of our society."'130 He also made the connection between divorce and crime
quite literally, telling the legislators that three-quarters of the juvenile delinquents and more than half of the inmates in penal institutions "come from broken homes."' 3' Free divorce was the villain for
Brown, a Roman Catholic, and he called on the committee
to "probe
3 2
and expose the core of this growing social problem.'

No legislative proposals emerged from this first round of activity.
But in the spring of 1966, Brown appointed the Governor's Commission on the Family, composed of two state senators, one assembly
representative, five judges, six attorneys, two law professors, one social worker, four physicians, and one member of the clergy.' 33 The
Commission was assigned four tasks:
1. study the framework of laws relating to the family and suggest
revision;
2. determine the feasibility of family life education courses for the public
schools;
3. consider developing uniform national standards of marriage and divorce jurisdiction; and
4. examine the establishment of state-wide Family1 3 4Courts, and recommend procedures for their most effective functioning.

The Governor's Commission largely ignored the second and third
assignments and, instead, concentrated its proposals on one integrated scheme, heavily influenced by the Archbishop of Canterbury's
group: no-fault dissolution of marriage, to be processed by a therapeutic Family Court. 3 5 Not only did the Commission quote at
127.

CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON JUDICIARY RELATING TO DOMESTIC RE-

LATIONS. FINAL REPORT,
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APPENDIX TO JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY Vol.

25-44 (Reg. Sess. 1965) [hereinafter FINAL
128. Krom, supra note 27, at 160.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 160-61.

135.

Id. at 2.
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supra note 127, at 176.

Id.
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length from PuttingAsunder: A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society, but its proposal linking the removal of fault to a transfer of
domestic cases to an administrative and therapeutic - rather than
purely adjudicative - body replicated the heart of the Church of
England report."3 6
The Commission tied the removal of fault grounds in California to
the operation of this powerful socio-legal agency, whose mission was
to provide therapeutic aid to salvage a foundering marriage. A formal termination of the matrimonial union was sanctioned upon proof
of marriage breakdown, but only "after penetrating scrutiny and after the parties have been given by the judicial process every resource
in aid of conciliation. 1 3. 7 This final thrust of the therapeutic divorce
movement is exemplified by Philip L. Hammer's discussion of the
pitfalls and pluses of mandatory counseling in the evolution of the
California experiment.13 8 Hammer acknowledged at the outset that
"requir[ing] a psychiatric type examination and counseling of persons seeking dissolution of their marriage is a potentially significant
interference by the state with the privacy and personal liberties of
the individual." ' 9 But, Hammer insisted, many situations warranted
state interference: when one spouse opposed the dissolution, when
minor children needed the state's protection, when the parties were
having difficulty working out a "rational" distribution of property,
when custody and support were unresolved, and, in general, when
psychiatric intercession was needed for the "reduction of anti-social
hostility and tension. 1 40 The claims favoring state intervention in
these instances "fairly clearly outweigh the interest of the individual
in being
free from inquiry by the state into the events of his private
life.' 4'
The rhetoric of therapy was in full flower in this proposed reform.
The new legal lexicon banished even the word "divorce." Candidates
for a "dissolution of marriage" would file, not a "complaint," but a
"petition of inquiry," reminiscent of Paul Alexander's conviction
that a divorce complaint should be considered "an application...
for the remedial services of the state.' 1 42 The case would no longer
136. Philip L. Hammer, Divorce Reform in California: The Governor's Commission on the Family and Beyond, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 32 (1968).
137. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 2.
138. Hammer, supra note 136, at 41.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 41-42.
141. Id.
142. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 80-81; Paul Alexander, Divorce

be captioned [Wife] v. [Husband], but the less-contentious In re the
Marriage of [Wife and Husband].14 Stress on marital counselling,
to be provided by a trained professional staff, would replace the former focus on adjudication and burdens of proof.1 44 The Sturm und
Drang of the adversary system would become obsolete, the Commission believed,
because grounds for divorce would 'no longer be
45
relevant.1
Upon the filing of the petition of inquiry, the court clerk was to
schedule a conciliation conference. 14 This initial interview was
mandatory, and attendance could be compelled by court order.147
Subsequently, the court's counselor was to inform the judge whether
the parties have decided to (a) become reconciled, (b) continue
counseling, or (c) resume "their application for an148inquiry into the
marriage, with a view to its possible dissolution.'"
The condescending psycho-babble in which that third option was
expressed perfectly illustrated the tendency of therapeutic divorce to
mask the reality of divorce, and is of a piece with Judge Pfaff's absurd assertion that nearly ninety percent of California divorces could
be averted "if only they knew.'
After the initial interview, a minimum waiting period of 120 days
was required before the formal dissolution hearing.5 0 During this
time, the counselor was expected to work with the parties and prepare a written report setting forth "the counselor's recommendations
together with supporting facts as to the continuance of the marriage."'' At the hearing, the court could make the decision that the
marriage had irreparably broken down.
If so, an immediate order
52
dissolving the union would follow.'
However, if the court was unable or unwilling to make such a
finding, the parties would face a ninety day continuance, during
which time they were encouraged to utilize the professional counseling facilities of the court. After this last delay, the court 1would
order
3
the marriage dissolved upon the request of either party.
Each stage of the litigation manifested the continual pressure to
convert a divorce action into a conciliation procedure. A determined
Without 'Guilt' or 'Sin, N.Y. TIMES, July .1, 1951 (Magazine), at 14.
143. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 81.
144. Id. at 82-85.
145. Id. at 80-85.
146. Id. at 82.
147. Id. at 82-83.
148. Id. at 83.
149. Krom, supra note 27, at 160.
150. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 83-84.
151. Id. at 90.
152. Id. at 91.
153. Id. at 92-93.
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couple could, of course, dodge the persuasive machinations and en-

dure the delays urban court -

eight months, or longer, particularly in a busy

until they were granted a "dissolution." But the very

process of stalling divorce-minded partners was an integral component of therapeutic divorce, premised as it was on the belief which contrary evidence could not dislodge - that divorce was at
heart an impulsive act.
Partisans of therapeutic divorce made a penchant of distinguishing
between marital breakdown and divorce. But they never understood
that a marriage usually dissolves, in fact, long before one of the
spouses decides to request a decree. Commenting on the applicability

of the English reforms to the United States, Monrad Paulsen
remarked:
[It was] astonishing how a vision of the atypical case has dominated the

discussion of divorce by consent. Debaters conjure up the vision of two in-

sincere pleasure seekers ready for new adventures rather than the common
case of a tragic, weary couple who have concluded at last that the pain
should cease.

54

In a 1966 address to the Family Law Section of the American Bar
Association, a Milwaukee family court judge humorously exemplified the reformers' illusion that delay is therapeutic:
They tell the story of a divorce-minded husband consulting an attorney in
Milwaukee about starting an action for dissolution of the marriage. "Well,
we'd start with serving and filing a summons only," the lawyer explained,
"then sixty days must elapse before we can file a complaint, and another
sixty days before the action can be tried. There would be a referral to the
Family Conciliation Department to discuss reconciliation. Because there are
minor children involved, there would have to be a preliminary hearing on
temporary custody and child support and the court might order a custody
investigation which might take an extra ninety days. If custody is in dispute, the judge would probably appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
minor and dependent children and he might need some time to prepare for
the trial
155 ... " "Forget it," said the husband, "I can't stay mad that
long."

The Governor's Commission derived the standard for dissolution
of marriage from two sources. The first was the opinion of Justice
154. Monrad G. Paulsen, Divorce - Canterbury Style, 1 VAL. U. L. REV. 93, 96
(1966).
155. Hansen, supra note 37, at 1. In his speech, the judge related another anecdote
which epitomized the disdain family court advocates felt for traditional divorce grounds:
"Do I have grounds for divorce?" the lady asked the lawyer. "Are you married?" the
lawyer asked the lady. "Yes," answered the lady. "Then you have grounds for divorce,"
answered the lawyer. Id. at 3. On the importance of making divorce a "time-consuming
process," see Aidan R. Gough, A Suggested Family Court System for California, 4
SANTA CLARA LAW.

212, 212-1"7 (1964).

Roger Traynor in DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 56 in which the California
Supreme Court had diluted the recrimination statute to allow a trial
judge to grant a divorce if, despite fault grounds on both sides, the
legitimate objects of matrimony had been destroyed. 117 The second
source was the work of the Archbishop's group, then recently
published. 158
Prior efforts at therapeutic divorce had succeeded only in adding
an ostensibly no-fault option to the statutory list of grounds. The
framers of California's reform were anxious to eliminate grounds altogether, in order to have total control of the dissolution process. 15 9
With this aim, the timing of the publication of Putting Asunder
could not have been more fortuitous. The Archbishop's group set
forth a detailed rationale for a clean slate, as well as an argument
for ending the perfunctory registration of undefended suits. 160
As the English proposal reasoned, the retention of fault grounds
leads to needless divorces and "'invests with spurious objectivity acts
[whose] real significance varies widely.' "61 Marital breakdown, on

the other hand, was theoretically not subject to collusive prior arrangement, and presented the issue of continuing the marriage in
terms far more amenable to therapeutic intervention than did adultery or extreme cruelty, particularly when those fault grounds were
so often understood to be faked. 62 Moreover, divorces would no
longer be "undefended," as the emphasis was no longer on contesting
charges but on conciliation,
and the court could command both
1 63
spouses to participate.
The Governor's Commission was more successful than the Archbishop's group in substituting marital breakdown for a fault standard in the final legislation. But the California reformers retained
the concept of individual blameworthiness when relevant to the determination of child custody, and when specific incidents of misconduct were "determined by the court to be necessary to establish the
existence of irreconcilable differences."'6 4 As explained by the Commission's co-chairs, the new court would be required to examine the
"whole picture of the marriage," including spousal misconduct,
156. 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
157. Id. at 872, 250 P.2d at 606.
158. PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 7.
159. GOVERNOR'S COMmiSsIoN, supra note 5, at 2.
160. PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 7, at 77-78, passim.
161. Richard C. Dinkelspiel & Aidan R. Gough, A Family Court Act for Contemporary California:A Summary of the Report of the CaliforniaGovernor's Commission
on the Family, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 363, 372 (1967) (alteration in original) (quoting PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 7, at 29).
162. PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 7, at 29-30.
163. Id. at 69-70.
164. Act of Jan. 1, 1970, ch. 1608, § 4509, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3325.
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16 5
which could be "completely explored."'
This large-mouthed exception to the ostensibly fault-free tenor of
the proposal did not escape serious criticism. On one level, this apparent aberration may simply have served to allow petitioners to
place their marital breakdown in context, what lawyers call res gestae. But what would be the effect on the desired "conciliatory and
uncharged atmosphere" of barring fault at the front door but allowing it to be "completely explored" when it entered at the rear? 66
Howard A. Krom argued that this revival of culpability undermined
the purposes of the law in permitting

the prejudicial introduction of fault-oriented testimony whenever a spouse
can convince the court that it would be necessary to establish the existence
of irreconcilable differences. This obviously creates an incongruity between
the no-fault criteria for dissolution
16 7 and the type of evidence needed to show
that one is entitled to a decree.

Lynne Carol Halem noted that, contrary to the reformers' promise,
this provision retained fault as an "integral component of the reform
law.",68
Although its language did not make it into the final legislation,
one of the bills proposing divorce reform included a provision that in
making its findings as to irreconcilable differences the court should
"be guided by, but not limited to, the statutory grounds and corresponding judicial decisions in effect prior to the effective date of this
act." I" Given this linguistic melange, the view that "fault concepts
may be unavoidable"' 70° in the new divorce procedure was quite reasonable, even if it turned out to be mistaken. Divorce may have been
written out of the domestic relations vocabulary in California, but
dissolutions were about to explode.

165. Richard C. Dinkelspiel & Aidan R. Gough, The Case For a Family Court A Summary of the Report of the California Governor's Commission on the Family,
FAM. L.Q., Sept. 1967, at 70, 78.
166. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY. REPORT
LEGISLATION, J. CAL. ASSEMBLY 8058 (Reg. Sess. 1969).

OF 1969 DIVORCE REFORM

167. Krom, supra note 27, at 179 (footnote omitted).
168. HALEM, supra note 65, at 244. See also Herma H. Kay, A Family Court:
The CaliforniaProposal,in DIVORCE AND AFTER 276 (Paul Bohannan ed., 1970) (criticizing the proposal).
169. Walker, supra note 88, at 208 (quoting Assembly Bill 530, § 4506 (proposed
by Assembly member James Hayes)).
170. Id.

IX.

THE MEANINGLESS STANDARD OF DISSOLUTION

The conservative aura of the reforms created the impression that
the Family Law Act of 1969171 would truly escalate the hurdles facing dissolution-minded couples. Both law review commentary and
appellate court interpretation reinforced the notion that California
No-Fault had closed the gates on divorce on demand.
In the statute's first year, Charles W. Johnson suggested that a
dissatisfied spouse seeking a dissolution must establish irreconcilable
differences by presenting "substantial reasons" for not continuing
the marriage.Y2 Appellate affirmation was not long in coming. In
1972, the California Supreme Court noted that while the legislature
had devised a no-fault, non-adversarial procedure, it "did not intend
that findings of irreconcilable differences be made perfunctorily. 173
The Court pointed out that the legislature had rejected a proposal
whereby the parties would be entitled to a divorce upon the processing of certain steps and the passage of a certain period of time.17 4 On
the contrary, the Family Law Act placed the trial court in the role
of " 'an overseeing participant to do its utmost to effect a healing of
the marital wounds.' ",5To perform this critical task, judges needed
to independently review evidence about the condition of the marriage. The Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that the
parties could consent to dissolve their marriage and have that consent constitute
the required establishment of irreconcilable
76
differences .
Even though the California reforms aimed to dethrone fault and
eliminate the acrimony of the adversarial system, the California Supreme Court continued its long-standing concern with collusion. It
worried about the parties' agreeing "that one of them would present
false evidence that their differences were irreconcilable and their
marriage had broken down irremediably."' 1 7 7 The Court never questioned how a trial judge was supposed to distinguish between genuine and ersatz matrimonial failure, when both parties were
determined to divorce. It merely ruled that it was the function of the
trial judge, not the parties,
to decide whether the evidence sufficed to
178
allow for a divorce.
171. See Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3323-24.
172. Charles W. Johnson, The Family Law Act: A Guide to the Practitioner,1
PAC. L.J. 147, 151 (1970).
173. McKim v. McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673, 679, 493 P.2d 868, 871, 100 Cal. Rptr.
140, 143 (1972).
174. Id. at 679, 493 P.2d at 871, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
175. Id. (quoting ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, REPORT OF 1969 DIVORCE
REFORMi LEGISLATION 8058 (Reg. Sess. 1969)).
176. Id. at 680, 493 P.2d at 872, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
177. Id.
178. Id.

[VOL, 31: 519. 1994]

No-Fault Marital Dissolution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

In asserting a distinction between the will of the trial court and
that of the parties seeking judicial sanction on their dissolution, the
Supreme Court was ignoring large chunks of the history of twentieth-century divorce. With the trial courts acclimated to a generation
or more of granting divorces upon the pious perjury of unchallenged
extreme cruelty or hotel adultery, it should have been apparent that
a general guideline that trial judges should make independent findings would be insufficient to change the practice of divorce in California. But more legal flotsam was to follow before the appellate
courts surrendered.
Soon after McKim was decided, a California Court of Appeal
handed down In Re Marriage of Walton," 9 addressing several chal-

lenges to the new law. The court determined from the legislative history that the irreconcilable differences to be proven by the plaintiff
"must be substantial as opposed to trivial or minor."' 0 The defendant would always have the opportunity to prove the contrary proposition, and Section 4509 of the California Civil Code gave the trial
judge discretion to receive evidence of specific acts of misconduct.' 8 '
The court rejected a standard "based upon the subjective attitude of
the parties,' 8 2 and insisted that the Family Law Act did not constitute a "license for dissolution of marriage by consent of the parties."' 1 3 The court concluded by emphasizing that the plaintiff had
the burden of establishing the existence of "substantial marital
problems which have so impaired the marriage relationship that the
legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and as to which
there is no8 4 reasonable possibility of elimination, correction or
resolution."'
But the vision of no-fault conceived by the reformers, that scrupulous trial courts -

not impulsive couples -

would determine the

right to a divorce, never materialized. Trial courts under California
no-fault simply refused to deny divorces under any circumstances.
X. THE COST OF THERAPY AND THE COST OF PRIVACY

Even if trial judges had been inclined, they could have performed
no inquests or investigations into the death of the marriages
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972).
Id. at 118, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
Id. at 115, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
Id. at 116, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
Id.
Id.

presented to them. The California legislature had vetoed the reformers' creation of a system of state-wide family courts. 185 The reasons
were two-fold. Concerns about the imperial judiciary injecting itself
into bedroom breakdowns buttressed fear of the stiff price tag for
therapeutic divorce. 186 Although some reformers, such as Herma
Hill Kay, claimed that the proposed family court system would subscribe to the "careful protection of individual privacy in the counseling process, "1187 a majority feared the rise of a controlling
bureaucracy whose clientele would not be lower-class juvenile delinquents and their families, but the legislators' "colleagues, friends,
and even themselves.' 88 Concerns about timeliness and efficiency
also led legislators to doubt that mandatory counseling was viable
when initiated at the courthouse door. 8" Finally, judges were not
keen on the changes in courtroom practice which therapeutic divorce
threatened. 90
The cost estimates for supplying the requisite psychiatrists and social workers were daunting. The Governor's Commission admitted
that "creating a professionally-staffed Family Court will not be an
inexpensive undertaking." ' But it hoped that the benefits obtained,
in terms of family case streamlining and prevention of "broken
homes," would be worth the fiscal sacrifice. 92 This cost-benefit analysis of family saving was not new. Max Rheinstein had made virtually the identical point a decade earlier: "If the [family] court
achieves what it is said it will, the cost of running it will easily be
185.

Aidan R. Gough, Divorce Without Squalor, NATION, Jan. 12, 1970, at 17,

20.
186. As the former executive director of the Governor's Commission on the Family
observed, the demise of the therapeutic family court was due to "cost, concern that a
family court structure would disrupt existing systems of court calendaring[,J and perhaps
a fear that 'social work' would dilute 'hard legal process.'" Id.
187. Kay, supra note 37, at 1244.
188. HALEM, supra note 65, at 285. Riane Tennehaus Eisler detailed the story of
California Assembly leader James Hayes, who shepherded key sections of the Family
Reform Act through the legislature while engaged in a rancorous divorce proceeding

against his wife.

RIANE T. EISLER, DISSOLUTION: No-FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND
THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 24-31 (1977).

Michael Wheeler provided similar illustrations from other states. One lawyer pushing
no-fault admitted an inability to get the attention of legislative leaders until "several ...
were in the midst of divorces and apparently they didn't like what they were experiencing, so our bill went through like gang-busters." An official of a state bar association told
Wheeler that the key to no-fault reform there was "the fact that the chairman of the
senate judiciary committee and the speaker of the house, who had both opposed us in the
past, were in the middle of messy marital situations when we reintroduced our bill, and
they switched right around." WHEELER, supra note 6, at 153.
189. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, REPORT OF 1969 DIVORCE REFORM
LEGISLATION 8056 (Reg. Sess. 1969).
190. See JACOB, supra note 4, at 58.

191.
192.

Dinkelspiel & Gough, supra note 165, at 74.
Id.
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overbalanced by the saving of the cost of juvenile delinquency, alcoholism, and general dependency of abandoned wives and children. 1' 9 3 But this argument faced its biggest test in California, and
it was not persuasive, in view of the growing sentiment in both the
legal and psychiatric professions that the sheriff and the therapist
did not blend.
Exactly how "not . . . inexpensive" family courts in California

would be was revealed in October 1967, when the Analyst for the
Joint Legislative Budget Committee calculated an additional yearly
expenditure of $4,427,500.1" Worse news was to come, for this analyst's estimate was the lowest received by the legislature. 195 The presiding judge of the Los Angeles Family Court Department testified
that the cost for a state-wide program could run as high as
$10,000,000 annually.'96 The higher valuation was generally believed
to be more accurate, and the legislature considered it an unacceptable additional burden on already distressed public coffers.' 9"
California's Family Law Act of 1969 resulted in the rapid expediting of divorces, as a "perfunctory judicial acknowledgement of marital breakdown replaced the parade of witnesses and staged
courtroom battles."' 198 As with prior divorce reforms, the legislative
and appellate law systems pursued their goals of articulating policy
norms and directing the evolution of formal legal rules, respectively.
The statutory language and the appellate opinions were filled with
the rhetoric of obstruction, a grandiloquent effort to render no-fault
more cumbersome than fault. As before, neither system had much
effect on divorce patterns.
Trial courts continued to pay little heed to case law or statute.
They found their roles as divorce registrars to be even more streamlined by the removal of the necessity to play audience to the farces
of fault which had been so much a part of their previous obligation.
Party behavior continued to strip down the dominant law system,
arriving finally at naked divorce.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Rheinstein, supra note 29, at 637.
Krom, supra note 27, at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
HALEM, supra note 65, at 251.

XI.

EPILOGUE: THE NAKED ARE SEARCHING FOR CLOTHES

Writing in 1977, seven years after the effective date of the California no-fault reform, Riane Tennehaus Eisler reported that not one
trial court had denied a dissolution petition for want of irreconcilable
differences.19 9 None of the forty-four California domestic relations
judges interviewed by Lenore Weitzman in the mid-1970s had ever
denied a petition for dissolution. 200 In 1975, the legislature repealed
the provision allowing the introduction into evidence of specific bad
acts to show the existence of irreconcilable differences.2 0 ' Plus Ca
change: both culpability and the very framework for divorce grounds
had disappeared. Plus c'est la mame chose: the formula had
changed, but division-minded wives and husbands did what they
wanted. The legal culture did not appear to substantively differentiate California divorcing in 1970 from the process a generation
earlier.
This analytical insouciance was misleading, however. A true cultural and jurisprudential revolution had, in fact, pushed the informal
law of divorce from "mutual consent," its operating gear for half a
century, to the watershed of "divorce on demand." As Herma Hill
Kay has pointed out, "Divorce by unilateral fiat is closer to desertion
than to mutual separation. "202
The California State Senate and Assembly were not, of course,
entirely responsible for the shifting cultural paradigms represented
by their reform law. The hell-for-leather individualism, which had
shattered the institutional family and whose baby boomer children
flaunted themselves during the "me" decade in the 1970S,203 reflects
today a much deeper concern with rights than with relationships.
Culture simultaneously creates law while being shaped by law and,
fundamentally, is law.
California-style no-fault has had some dramatic outputs. No-fault
enshrined in statute what American culture had been edging toward
in other aspects of life: a predilection for absolute gender egalitarianism. This result, achieved with virtually no participation by organized women's groups, was initially perceived by many women as a
splendid enhancement of their status both in marriage and after.20 4
199.

EISLER, supra note 188, at 10.

200. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 19

(1985).
201. 1975 Cal. Stat. 59.
202. Herma H. Kay, Beyond No-fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 8 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds.,
1990).
203. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287
(1989).
204. JACOB, supra note 4, at 3, 23.
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Second thoughts, however, came quickly. Martha L. Fineman has
argued that the no-fault "revolution" was exactly that: a 360 degree
turn which brought us "back to where we substantively began. 20 5
The earlier focus on formal equality has been replaced by a feminist
debate over the competing subjectivities within no-fault. For many
women, no-fault divorce signified achievable freedom and societal
validation for goals of self-actualization. But "[w]hat apparently escaped notice," commented Deborah L. Rhode, "were the inequalities
in men's and women's status following divorce." 206
The rejection of protectionist ideals of law has focused attention
on the many ways in which reality remains gendered. Feminists have
focused attention on how women's "disproportionate assumption of
'private' domestic responsibilities has constrained their 'public' opportunities. 201 Mothers predominantly retain child custody after divorce, 20 8 and employed women continue to receive grossly unequal
compensation for their labor.2 9 Many agree with Mary Ann Mason's argument that, for women, the "concept of equality is a
trap. 21o
In jurisprudential terms, feminism today is split between advocates of legal equality and champions of reifying women's differences.211 Although the current debate is more nuanced, it resembles
the hefty disputations earlier this century between supporters of protectionist legislation for women in industry and staunch defenders of
equal rights for the sexes. The dilemma floods over academic boundaries: by the late 1980s, half of all single-parent families had dipped
below the poverty line, and seventy percent of those families were
205. Martha L. Fineman, Neither Silent, Nor Revolutionary, 23 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 945, 945 (1989) (reviewing HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988)). Fineman expanded on this
point in

THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM

passim (1991).
206. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW 149 (1989) (footnote omitted); see also KEVIN GRAY, THE REALLOCATION OF
PROPERTY ON DIVORCE 286-87 (1977).
207. Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning
the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 202, at 193.
208.
209.

RILEY, supra note 88, at 168.
MARY
A. MASON, THE EQUALITY
SHOULDN'T BE TREATED LIKE MEN 20 (1988).

TRAP:

WHY

WORKING

WOMEN

210. Id. at 25.
211. See Lisa C. Bower, Unsettling 'Woman'. Competing Subjectivities in Nofault Divorce and Divorce Mediation, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: THE DIFFERENCE
DEBATE 209-230 (Leslie F. Goldstein ed., 1992).

headed by divorced or separated women."'
While five percent of all children lived only with their mother in
1960, twenty-seven percent did so in 1990.213 More than seventy percent of incarcerated juveniles come from fatherless homes.214 Judith
Wallerstein's study of the effect of divorce on children found that
five years after the split, over one-third of the children suffered from
moderate or severe depression.215 Despite common assumptions
about children's vaunted resilience, Wallerstein continued to find serious adverse consequences in children ten and fifteen years after the
parents' divorce.2 16 That divorce may inflict life-long emotional harm
is the premise of Diane Fassel's Growing Up Divorced: A Road to
Healingfor Adult Children of Divorce. 11
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has called for a "cultural conversation about the family" to explore "cultural solutions" to the
problems stemming from the excesses of divorce. 218 The conversation
has started, but the early dialogue sets a cacophonous tone: juxtapose a Newsweek cover story on "Deadbeat Dads: Wanted for Failure to Pay Child Support"18 with Mary Frances Berry's The
Politics of Parenthood:Child Care, Women's Rights, and the Myth
of the Good Mother.22 °
Nor are women any closer to resolving the work/family dilemma:
compare Answers to the Mommy Track: How Wives and Mothers in
Business Reach the Top and Balance Their Lives,221 with Staying
Home: From Full-Time Professional to Full-Time Parent.222 Answers to the Mommy Track introduces readers to "women who are
extremely dedicated to career goals but simultaneously demonstrate
the great lengths to which they will go to be responsible to family
212.
213.

RHODE, supra note 206, at 149.

214.
215.

Id. at 77.
Id. at 65.

Barbara D. Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1993 at 47,

50.

216. Id. at 64-65; see also JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFrER DIVORCE (1989).
217. DIANE FASSEL, GROWING Up DIVORCED: A ROAD TO HEALING FOR ADULT

CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (1991). Several relevant social science studies are discussed in
Whitehead, supra note 213, and in Nancy R. Gibbs, Bringing Up Father,TIME, June 28,
1993, at 53.
218. Barbara D. Whitehead, The New Family Values, UTNE READER, May/June
1993, at 61, 66 (excerpted from FAM. AFF. (Summer 1992)).
219. Steven Waldman, Deadbeat Dads, NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1992, at 46.
220. MARY F. BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CHILD CARE, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS. AND THE MYTH OF THE GOOD MOTHER (1993).
221. TRUDI FERGUSON & JOAN S. DUNPHY, ANSWERS TO THE MommY TRACK:
How WIVES AND MOTHERS IN BUSINESS REACH THE TOP AND BALANCE THEIR LIVES
(1991).
222. DARCIE SANDERS & MARTHA M. BULLEN, STAYING HOME: FROM FULL-TIME
PROFESSIONAL TO FULL-TIME PARENT (1992).
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commitments. 2 23 Staying Home, dedicated by its authors "to our
mothers, who stayed home for us," rejects any track for women but
motherhood, which it claims has become the "most controversial career" for a woman. 2 4 Staying Home is, in turn, rebutted by Katherine Wyse Goldman's My Mother Worked and I Turned Out
Okay,225 although the defensive tone of Goldman's title may indicate
a shifting in the wind.
New challenges, at times, prompt old responses, and some have
thought the unthinkable, calling for the return of fault.226 Law professor Stephen D. Sugarman has observed that the "rhetorical force"
of a broadside against the no-fault system "can be enhanced if set in
the context of an innocent and a guilty spouse. '2 7 He has outlined
several roles appropriate for reinvigorated fault, such as in cases involving "reprehensible conduct," or the allowance of a tort suit for
the wronged spouse on top of the recovery obtained by application of
the no-fault law.2 28
A recent court challenge to California no-fault claimed that divorce on demand violated the Constitution, focusing its argument on
the sham nature of the court's role:
It is unrealistic in the present judicial climate ... to expect due process in
dissolution proceedings, since the outcome is determined in advance by the
desire of one party to end a marriage ... Considering the fact that approximately two million divorces have been granted by California trial courts
since 1970, the empirical evidence supports the assumption that a fair hearing in a contested divorce proceeding, giving sufficient consideration to the
parties to enable them to prevail, is not a legal reality in
contesting 229
California.

223. FERGUSON & DUNPHY, supra note 221, at ix.
224. SANDERS & BULLEN, supra note 222, at v, ix.
225. KATHERINE W. GOLDMAN, MY MOTHER WORKED AND I TURNED OUT OKAY
(1993). For men, the conversation has barely started. See John B. Barry, Daddy-track:
How About Balancing Fatherhoodand Career?, UTNE READER, May/June 1993, at 70
(excerpted from MOTHERING (Spring 1989)); Gibbs, supra note 217.
226. Whitehead, supra note 218, at 71; Kay, supra note 202, at 19; Stephen D.
Sugarman, DividingFinancialInterests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 202, at 136.
227. Sugarman, supra note 226, at 136.
228. Id. at 136-37. Sugarman did not advocate a return to fault, but described
potential ways to reintroduce culpability in divorce law.
229. Harold 0. J. Brown, Easy Divorce Challenged as Breaking of Contract,
DAILY PROGRESS (Charlottesville, Va.), May 3, 1992, at A7 (quoting In re Sutherland,
an unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District).
Brown, the editor of The Religion and Society Report, noted that three states had introduced legislation to allow couples to marry under a "marriage contract," which would
provide them, in Brown's words, "protection against unilateral abrogation" as permitted
by no-fault statutes. Id.

What is a legal reality in California, as throughout America, is
that naked divorce has gone too far. The -

to some -

astonishing

suggestion that the concept of culpability might stage a comeback in
the divorce ring illustrates the fascinating contingency of history.
Twentieth-century legal culture has reached an impasse on divorce.
A new legal and cultural matrix must now emerge.

